Hegel’s Critique of Empiricism and Idealism as Forms of Dualism

The research project has two objectives: (a) to reexamine Hegel’s critique of the two seemingly opposed traditions of English empiricism (mainly J. Locke and D. Hume) and German philosophy of the subject (Im. Kant, J.G. Fichte, F. H. Jacobi) in his early Jena writings, and (b) to correlate this review with the first three sections of the Phenomenology, in order to propose a new interpretative direction with regard to this text.  Regarding the first objective, our investigation is organized on the basis of Hegel’s critique, which faults both philosophical traditions with a dualistic model of truth. This dualism lies in the inability of both traditions to reconcile the cognitive abilities of the subject with the perceived object or, in other words, knowledge with truth, thus leaving room for theories of truth that are non-reducible to the cognitive abilities of the subject. Secondly, the results of the assessment of this criticism are related to the first three sections of the Phenomenology, in which there are strong indications that the critique of dualism is repeated, this time in a disguised manner. Through this correlation we illuminate the context in which Hegel constructs his own proposal and will thus give new impetus to the interpretation of the Phenomenology of Spirit. This research has multiple results: It contributes to a re-evaluation of Hegel’s relationship with empiricism during the Jena period, which is a dimension that has been underestimated in the literature to date. It identifies Hegel’s particular use of the concept of dualism as a form of reason that fails to capture the complex structure of truth. Finally, we relate this criticism to the first sections of the Phenomenology of Spirit, thus introducing a new interpretative perspective that is not based on a prior adoption of interpretative principles, but reconstructs Hegel's philosophical proposal through his negative stance towards dualism.