Aesthetic Perception: Analytic and Phenomenological Perspectives in Dialogue

It is a popular view in contemporary aesthetic theory that our awareness of aesthetic qualities is perceptual and that, moreover, aesthetic perception is essential to aesthetic judgment. There are two objections, however, that can seem to undermine unqualified endorsement of this view, despite the phenomenally immediate character of our awareness of aesthetic qualities: (i) aesthetic qualities, it is noted, are perceptually elusive: perceptual access to the non-aesthetic qualities of an object does not guarantee ascription of the same (or any) aesthetic property by different observers; (ii) we have a shared practice in aesthetic criticism of backing up ascriptions of an aesthetic property by highlighting the non-aesthetic properties on which it supervenes. In both these respects aesthetic properties are unlike undisputed objects of perception, e.g. colors, in which case their perceptual status is seriously challenged. It is the aim of this research to confront this challenge, especially since earlier attempts have not been successful. In particular, drawing on contemporary philosophy of mind and the phenomenology and psychology of perception, an enactive account of perception will be defended that (i) bridges the gap between aesthetic and non-aesthetic (perceptual) properties in terms of phenomenal character and conditions of awareness; (ii) indicates that the latter, like, the former can be elusive (subject to non-visual influences); and (iii) illustrates that the demand of justification, noted above, is latent in all cases where recognition activates an extensive or elaborate background of concepts and skills.