Deliberative Citizenship: Claims-Making and Deliberation by Muslim Actors in Britain, France, and Switzerland

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While the previous chapter has examined the public dimension of deliberative regimes in an attempt to characterize the deliberative quality and the main features of deliberation in the three countries included in our study, confronting deliberative regimes with citizenship regimes, this chapter narrows down the analysis to the level of the actors, examining how they deliberate in public claims-making and how this varies across our three countries. Our main focus is obviously on Muslim actors, although at times this requires also to look at the claims-making by other actors from the civil society to some extent, so as to have a reference point for assessing the extent and quality of deliberation of Muslim actors.

The main goal of our analysis in this chapter is to characterize the deliberative quality and the main features of external, public deliberation by Muslim actors, based on claims-making data and method (Hutter 2014; Koopmans and Statham 1999). These data are well suited to capture the public dimension of deliberation, as opposed to its "private" side. While the previous chapter focused on the structural component of such public dimension of deliberation, this chapter addresses its agentic side. This aspect will then be further developed in the next chapter when we will analyze the materials stemming from the interviews with Muslim organizations.

The chapter unfolds as follows. To begin with, we discuss some theoretical elements concerning the presence of Muslims in the public domain and their claims-making. Then we move to the claims-making data. The analysis follows three steps: a first, general step describing the claims-making of Muslim actors as well as other actors in the three countries; a second, key step showing the extent and quality of deliberation of Muslim actors in public claims-making, again in a comparative perspective; and a third and final step with a more explanatory twist in an attempt to show the correlates of Muslims' public deliberation. The concluding section will recall the main argument of the chapter and summarize the main findings of the analysis.

Muslims and the Public Domain

Muslims have been the object of a wealth of studies in recent years which have looked at the most disparate aspects. A large part of these studies, however, are either theoretical discussions of the supposedly negative or positive effects of the Muslim presence in Europe or empirical analyses of public opinion about them, often aimed to assess the extent to which citizens views Muslims and more specifically their demands for group rights (Statham 2016), in an attempt to assess the conditions for their integration. In other words, Muslims in these perspectives are often treated as objects. More rarely, research has also looked at Muslims as subject actors. Even these works, however, often focus on individual actors or examine the collective level by aggregating

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information from the individual level, for example using survey data, again in view of assessing the conditions – this time on the side of Muslims themselves – for their integration, for example in terms of labor market participation (Koopmans 2016) and often focusing on their values (Banfi et al. 2016).

Previous research has also investigated the conditions that might favor or prevent the integration of Muslims in their European societies of settlement and, more specifically, their political inclusion, following a comparative perspective. Differences across European countries have been an important factor hampering the emergence of a common European approach to immigration and integration. Although the need for such a common approach is widely endorsed, there is equally wide disagreement on what such a common approach should look like. The EURISLAM project aimed to contribute to resolving this issue by providing a systematic analysis of cross-national differences and similarities in countries' approaches to the cultural integration of immigrants, and of Muslims in particular, and by relating these policy differences to cross-national variation in cultural distance and interaction between Muslims and the receiving society population.

This EU-funded project, conducted between 2008 and 2012, has studied how the incorporation of Islam in Europe is influenced by national traditions of identity, citizenship and church-state relations, using a variety of data and methodologies. One such methods and the related findings has special relevance for our present purpose. It consisted in a systematic comparative analysis of the content of public debates on Islam in the mass media through the method of political claims analysis which has helped advance the comparative literature in the field of ethnic relations by investigating an area of research which has been overlooked in the past. That analysis, more specifically, has made three main contributions (Cinalli and Giugni 2013). Firstly, it dealt with the increasing salience of specific Islam issues in countries of large Muslim settlement. Secondly, it revealed reveal longitudinal country convergences and differences, hence providing a long-term appraisal of the public debate beyond the punctuated, most dramatic and spectacular happenings in the field of Islam. Thirdly, it shed new light on the implications of national policy processes and distinct logics of integration in terms of discursive framing in the field, the behavior of key actors such as political parties and, more broadly, the possibility for Muslims to play a key role of political entrepreneurship beyond their own specific cultural concerns.

These analyses, however, has focused on the shaping of public debates on Islam in general or on more specific aspects such as the prominence of certain actors as compared to others, the focus on certain issues rather than others, the centrality of cultural and religious issues in those debates, and the implications of all this for the political inclusion of Muslims in Europe. More rarely have researchers focused on claims by Muslims more specifically. Even in those works of claims-making by Muslim actors, however, the focus has remained on a more traditional approach inspired by previous studies (Koopmans et al. 2005) and stressing, among other things, the importance of Muslims' demands for cultural group rights (Statham et al 2005). What is still missing is an analysis of the extent to which deliberation is present in public debates, which we started in the previous chapter, and more specifically an analysis of the extent and quality of public deliberation by Muslim actors, which we endeavor in this chapter.

Our analysis in this chapter will therefore try to fill a gap in the literature by examining the extent to which as well as the ways Muslims deliberate in the public domain. In other words, we are

specifically interested in the extent and quality of the public deliberation by Muslim actors, and above all in how it may vary across our three countries. Remember that we selected these countries because of their different citizenship models – or "philosophies of integration" (Favell 1996) – and the implications this may have for the political inclusion of Muslims and more generally the place of Islam in Europe. Here we aim to ascertain whether the deliberative regimes identified in Chapter 4 is reflected in the ways Muslims deliberate publicly when they engage in political claims-making. To do so, it is useful to operate a distinction between the conditions for and the quality of public deliberation. On the one hand, deliberation rests on certain conditions which might favor it or, on the contrary, make it more difficult. Given the fundamental normative dimension entailed by the idea and concept of deliberation, one such conditions lies in the presence of values that are compatible with deliberation. On the other hand, deliberation may be characterized in terms of greater or poorer quality. This may be seen in a number of aspects, such as symmetry, reciprocity, a focus on the general interest and still others, which have been stressed by the theoretical literature on deliberation as discussed in Chapter 2. Our analysis is geared towards providing evidence allowing us to appraise the conditions for public deliberation by Muslim actors, the quality of such public deliberation, and to what extent both aspects vary across three countries characterized by different citizenship regimes.

Muslim Actors in the Public Domain

Studying the conditions for public deliberation of Muslim actors' in the public domain presupposes that we know they main characteristics of how their public interventions. Therefore, here we describe the claims-making by Muslim actors and how it resembles or differs from that of other actors, with a special focus on non-institutional actors. We also aim to show cross-national variations. To do so, unlike what is usually done in studies based on political claims-making analysis, our cross-national comparison does not compare claims made in one country with those made in another one. Instead, we rely on a measure that captures the concept of public space or domain, which is the one that informs our analysis as discussed in previous chapters. We consider a claim to belong to a given national public space when it refers to the debate in that country, regardless of where it was physically made (it could have been made abroad). While in practice this does not matter much, we believe it important conceptually.[1]

To describe the public interventions of Muslim and other actors in the public domain we can follow the basic structure of a claim, as indicated in previous research (Koopmans et al. 2005). This can be seen as including seven elements: the location of the claim in time and space (when and where is the claim made), the claimants (who makes the claims), the form of the claim (how is the claim inserted in the public sphere), the addressee of the claim (at whom is the claim directed), the substantive issue of the claim (what is the claim about), the object actor (who is or would be affected by the claim, and the justification for the claim (why). Leaving out when and where, each claim then can be characterized along the following grammatical sequence: the claimant or subject actor, undertakes some sort of action in the public sphere to get another actor, the addressee, to do or leave something affecting the interests of a third actor, the object, and provides a justification for why this should be done. Of course, not always all this information is present in the source – in our case, the newspaper article – from where the claim is drawn, either because the claimant did not include it or because the source did not report it. However, ideally a

claim has these basic elements and also include other, secondary aspects, such as for example the territorial scope of the actor making the claim or the issue addressed by the claim.

Let us start with the most basic information: the relative share of claims of Muslim actors in the public domain, as compared to that of other actors. Table 5.1 show the distribution of all claims in our three countries during the period under consideration, using a basic distinction between state and party actors – that is, institutional actors – civil society actors – that is, non-institutional actors – and Muslim actors, then detailing the more specific categories of claimants. While they are obviously also part of civil society actors, Muslims are set apart here as they represent our main focus of attention. Like all the others in this chapter, the claims reported in this table refer to the period from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2016.[2]

Table 5.1

Looking at the more general categories, we can see that state and party actors play more or less the same role in public debates about Islam in the three countries, as their share of claims is very close. This, of course, means that civil society actors are also more of less equally present, unless we exclude Muslims, then French civil society actors have a large share. Differences, however, can be observed in the more specific categories. Thus, amongst the institutional actors, the government (at all territorial-administrative levels, not only the national government, although national governments form the large part of these claims) are more active in Britain and France, much less so in Switzerland, while parties intervene more frequently in the latter country.[3] Amongst the non-institutional actors, we notice a more important role of media and journalists in France and a less important role of researchers, think thanks and intellectuals in Britain. We also notice, somewhat surprisingly, that both pro-minority and anti-minority actors are not so central in claims making in this field.

Yet, the key aspect in our perspective is the share of claims made by Muslim actors. A we can see, Muslims actively participate in public debates in all three countries, as more than one quarter of all claims have been made by them.[4] At the same time, they play a greater role in Britain, followed by their Swiss and then French counterparts. It is worth confronting this finding with those obtained in two previous studies. In their research on claims-making in the field of immigration and ethnic relations politics, by Koopmans et al. (2005) found a much higher share of claims by migrants and minorities in Britain, a much lower share in Switzerland, and a mid-way share in France. They explained these variations with the different citizenship models in the three countries which provide more or less opportunities for claims-making by those actors. The data reported by Cinalli and Giugni (2013), focusing on Islam, found a similar pattern of variation, albeit a less neat one. Thy found that claims by Muslim organizations and groups are still largest in Britain, but France is not so far away in this regard, while Switzerland lag far behind amongst these three countries. Our data, which refers to a more recent period, yield a somewhat different picture, whereby the share of claims by Muslim actors is still largest in Britain, but Switzerland comes much closer and displays a larger share of Muslim claims than in France. All this suggests that, in spite of certain structural trends, the presence of collective actors in the public domain is sensitive to the period and varies over time.

From now on, we focus exclusively on claims by Muslim actors, in an attempt to characterize how they participate in public debates on Islam. We start from looking at the forms of their

interventions, another key aspects of political claims analysis. The distributions, shown in Table 5.2, also allow us to stress once again that claims include both verbal statements and collective mobilizations, that is, physical actions. As we can see, however, the overwhelming majority of claims take a verbal form, which is not surprising. The share of verbal claims, however, is lower in France than in the other two countries. This means, more interestingly, that non-verbal claims are more common the France. This apply to both conventional actions (all sorts of non-demonstrative meetings, judicial action, direct-democratic action, petitioning) and protest actions (demonstrative, confrontational, violent). The latter remain quite low across the board, especially in Switzerland. Furthermore, violent protests are more frequent in France than in the other two countries. While this meets expectations by political opportunity theorists (Kriesi et al. 1995), the most important aspect for our present purpose is that it confirms that, quite surprisingly, the degree of contentiousness over Islam is relatively limited, at least as far as the forms of public interventions are concerned (Cinalli and Giugni 2013). In other words, in spite of a series of terrorist attacks that has hit several European countries – above all France – in recent years conflicts around the place of Islam in Europe expresses itself more verbally than physically or by means of protest activities. The forms of claims by Muslim actors support this statement.

Table 5.2

Claims often refer or are addresses to specific actors. Sometimes this is explicitly stated, some others it is more implicit. Such a reference may be neutral, but may also entail an evaluative element, either positive or negative. Our coding scheme included information about three types of targeted actors: addresses, criticized actors, and supported actors.[5] Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 shows the distribution of claims in the three countries according to these three criteria, using the same actor categories as before. Since only a part of all claims have an explicit addressee, criticized actor or supported actor, these percentages should be taken with some grain of salt.

Tables 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5

The most striking finding concerning the addressees (Table 5.3) is perhaps that the majority of claims target civil society actors. While one might expect claims to be most often addressed to state actors – after all, contentious politics by definition always involved the state as target, claimants, or third party (McAdam et al. 2001) – here we see on the contrary that debates about Islam often locates at the societal level. This holds across the three countries, with only minimal differences in the more general categories. The more specific ones, however, displays some differences. The most relevant are perhaps the higher share of claims addressing the state in Switzerland, but even more so the higher share of targeted religious and minority actors in France than in Britain and especially Switzerland, and the equally higher share of claims targeting media and journalists in France and above all in Switzerland as compared to a very low percentage in Britain. If we consider that religious and minority actors are made above all of Muslim actors (CHECK) and we confront this table with the one on the actors of claims, we may conclude from this that, while less active as claimants, Muslims in France address their claims to other Muslim actors than in Britain and especially Switzerland.

Other actors are not only targeted in "neutral" terms, as addresses of claims; sometimes they are mention either in positive or negative terms. Starting from the latter (Table 5.4), Swiss Muslims mostly criticize other civil society actors, while British and especially French ones are more often

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critical of the state and political parties. Perhaps this reflects the higher trust and more "respectful" attitude Swiss have towards political institutions in general. Amongst state and party actors, the government (at all levels) are by and large the most often criticized in all three countries. Parties are more critically viewed in French than in the other two countries. Amongst civil society actors, religious and minority actors – hence, mainly other Muslims – are most often criticized. This occurs above all in Britain and France, less so in Switzerland, where media and journalists, but above all anti-minority actors – basically, extreme-right organizations and groups – are much more frequently criticized.

The distribution of claims across the two main actor categories is more unbalanced when it comes to supported actors (Table 5.5). In this case, the overwhelming majority of claims that have a supported actor mentioned civil society organizations, groups, or individuals. Yet, British Muslims tend to provide even less support to the state and political parties than their French and Swiss counterpart, while they support more often religious and minority actors than French Muslims.

The next key aspect of the presence of Muslims in public debates refers to the substantive issues addressed by their claims. We have seen in Chapter 5 how public debates on Islam is structures in terms of main issues addressed and the extent to which this reflects the idea of claims-making reflecting citizenship regimes as stressed in previous studies (Cinalli and Giugni 2013; Koopmans et al. 2005). Are the thematic foci of claims in general reflected in the claims by Muslim actors? Table 5.6 shows their distribution across the three countries. We make a broad distinction between claims addressing six main groups of issues: immigration, asylum, and alien politics (in brief, the regulation of immigration flows); minority integration politics; anti-racism; anti-islamophobia; islamophobic claims (the opposite of the previous category); and actor claims Muslims. The latter refer to claims made by Muslim on issues other than Islam. Within some of these broad categories, we further distinguish a number of more specific issues.

Table 5.6

Largely reflecting the thematic foci of claims in general, virtually all the claims by Muslim actors deal with issues other than those referring to immigration, asylum, and alien politics. This applies to all three countries, including Switzerland, where traditionally immigration politics – as opposed to immigrant politics – receives a lot of attention in political claims-making (Koopmans et al. 2005). This, however, is less true when it comes to public discourses on Muslims and Islam (Cinalli and Giugni 2013). With little country variations, the overwhelming majority of claims deal with minority integration politics. Nearly three quarter of all claims address minority integration issues in all three countries. Some variations can be discerned in the other broad categories. In particular, in Britain we observe a larger share of islamophobic claims – in a way, a sign of a conflicting climate within the Muslim community itself (CHECK) – and, conversely, a larger share of anti-islamophobic claims than in the other two countries. Finally, claims made by Muslim actors on issues other than Islam (actor claims Muslims) are more or less equally distributed across the three countries. Nearly all of these claims concern transnational politics rather than homeland politics, mostly relating to the war in Syria and the self-styled Islamic State.

While there is little differences across our three countries in the broad categories, most of the claims dealing with minority integration politics in all three countries, we observe some

variations in the more specific issue categories. Those relating to minority integration politics are particularly relevant in this context. As we can see, in Britain, half of them relate to minority social problems. These have mostly to do with Islamic extremism and violence, including and perhaps most prominently the question of jihadism and terrorist attacks. Muslims clearly were much concerned about this problem, although here we do not know whether in positive or negative terms. A large, albeit more limited, share of claims on this issue are also present in France and Switzerland. In these two countries, we also observe a large share of claims dealing with minority rights and participation, while political and social rights are less often mentioned (not shown in the table). Amongst the latter, most have to do with cultural and, more specifically, religious rights. Thus, broadly speaking, British Muslims are above all concerned with the problem of Islamic extremism and violence – probably trying to stand out in this regards, as they were often asked to do it publicly – while French and Swiss Muslims are also worried by this aspect, but at the same time they are also concerned with the lack of religious rights, which are institutionally less guaranteed in these two countries than in Britain. Other specific issue categories are less important. Yet, we observe a sizeable share of claims dealing with minority integration in general in Switzerland. Finally, islamophobia in institutional contexts are the main concern of Muslims in and Switzerland, while in France anti-islamophobic claims are more equally referring to institutional and non-institutional islamophobia.

Before we turn to the core aspects relating to Muslims' public deliberation, it is worth taking a look at the scope of claims. Table 5.7 shows the distribution of claims in tour three countries according to the territorial scope of the actors making them and that of the issues addressed. We distinguish between a supra- or transnational, a foreign national or bilateral, a national, and a subnational (regional or local) scope of both actors and issues. Overall, we observed a much nationalized field, if we include both national and subnational actors and issues. This holds above all for the actors, while issues are more supra- or transnationalized, with the partial exception of France. Country differences, however, are quite important on both counts. On the one hand, subnational actors take the lion's share in Britain and France, but it is somewhat less important in Switzerland. The national level is also very important, especially in the latter country. Supra- or transnational actors, as well as foreign national or bilateral actors are less present, although the former play a relevant role in Britain and France and the latter in Switzerland. On the other hand, French Muslims display a greater focus on subnational issues and the three countries do not vary much in terms of the focus on national issues. In contrast, British and Swiss Muslims address more often address their claims to the supra-national or transnational level.

Table 5.7

In sum, this descriptive look at the features of the claims made by Muslim actors in our three countries suggests that Muslims actively participate in public debates in all three countries, although here we should take into account the fact that, unlike for all other actors, for them we also coded claims not dealing with Islam. Their presence, however, is greater in Britain and Switzerland than in France. Like other actors, when their presence in the public domain takes predominantly a verbal form, while protest actions are quite rare – although somewhat more frequent in France – suggesting a limited degree of contentiousness of their political claims-making. Further, the majority of Muslim claims target civil society actors. Significant differences, however, may be observed across countries also in this respect, as well as concerning actors either negatively (criticized actors) or positively (supported actors) referred to. Concerning

the substantive foci of claims, the overwhelming majority of claims deal with minority integration politics. This holds across all three countries, with little country variation. However, there is a larger share of islamophobic claims in Britain. Moreover, cross-national differences may be observed in the more specific issues within the broader categories. Finally, we also noted that debates about Islam are very nationalized field, meaning that they most often involve national and subnational actors and issues. This, however, vary to some extent across the three countries.

Deliberation by Muslim Actors in the Public Domain

We now turn to the analysis of deliberation of Muslim actors in the public domain. This is one side of the agentic dimension of deliberation, namely the public side. The other side – the "private" side – will be dealt with in the next chapter. As we discussed at length in Chapter 2 from a normative perspective and in Chapter 3 from an operation point of view, deliberation presupposes a number of conditions. One such conditions is certainly the fact of stressing a number of values which are compatible with deliberative citizenship, such as equality, inclusiveness, and transparency (della Porta 2005). Translated into the analysis of deliberation in political claims-making, this implies looking at the underlying values conveyed in the actors' framing of a given issue.

Our codebook included a variable listing about 40 different value frames. We consider the following ones as supporting or favoring deliberation: equal treatment; fairness; openness/transparency; trust; truthfulness, honesty, and sincerity; respect for difference; and mutual understanding. Table 5.8 shows the aggregated percentage of claims conveying those deliberative values in our three countries, opposing them to all other, non-deliberative, value frames. Overall, about one quarter of the claims for which a value could be coded frame their issue in terms of deliberative values.[6] It is obviously hard to say whether this is much or little in the absence of some kind of benchmark. This is why, as for all other aspects considered in this chapter, the comparative perspective is what interests us the most. In this case, however, the overall picture does not vary much across countries. The share of deliberative values is slightly higher in France, followed by Switzerland and then Britain, but the differences are very small, as also witnessed by the non-significant statistical test. Thus, generally speaking, in Britain, French and Switzerland there seems to be a common ground as far as the normative conditions for public deliberation are concerned. The relative weight of each specific value is not the same in the three countries, though (not shown in the table). For example, although the low number of observations calls for caution, equal treatment and fairness seem more important in Britain and France than in Switzerland, while openness/transparency are more important in Switzerland, and mutual understanding appear more often in France and Switzerland than in Britain.

Table 5.8

Values or value frames are only one aspect of deliberation in the public domain. Other aspects may be ascertained in political claims-making which are more directly linked to deliberative interactions and may be seen as characterizing the deliberative quality of Muslim claims. In our analysis we have tried to identify six key indicators. Their distributions across the three countries are shown in Table 5.9. In addition to the six variables taken separately, we also show the

percentage of claims that has at least three of the six features as well as an overall standardized index or deliberation.[7]

<div align="center">Table 5.9</div>

As discussed earlier, symmetry clearly is a crucial aspect of deliberation. In our political claims analysis – but also more generally – it refers to the degree to which speakers treat each other as equal discussants. In our coding scheme, we operated a simple distinction between symmetric (speakers treated others as equals), asymmetric (speakers did not treat others as equals), and ambiguous (when both elements were identified) claims.[8] The distribution of claims according to this criterion yields an important unbalance between Britain and France, on one hand, and Switzerland, on the other. To be sure, the overall level of symmetry is high to very high in all three countries, but French Muslims seems considerably less symmetric in their interventions than their British and Swiss counterparts. This, as well as most of the indicators considered here, clash in some way against the finding concerning deliberative values, which are slightly more often present in France. But one thing is to refer to deliberative values – the conditions for deliberation – another is to be deliberative when making a claim.

Cross-national variations can also be observed in the degree to which the actors are open to deliberation, another important aspect to be considered. Deliberative theory refer to this aspect as reciprocity. More specifically, here we distinguish between reciprocal (speakers were open to change their position according to others' arguments), non-reciprocal (speakers were not open to change their position according to others' arguments), and ambiguous (when both elements were identified) claims.[9] Reciprocity clearly is more demanding than symmetry, as witnessed by the much smaller percentage of claims that entails this feature of deliberation. This is particularly true in Switzerland, when only a tiny share of the claims were characterized by reciprocity.

Deliberation entails the strength of the better argument (Habermas 1981). Therefore, an important part of deliberation lies in the kind of justification that is brought to sustain a claim. We operationalized this aspect through a variable measuring the degree to which a conclusion can be inferred from the reason or argument that is offered in support of it, that is, the degree to which deliberative interventions are adequately justified. Here we distinguished between claims with no justification (the actor claims that we should do X, but fails to offer a supporting reason), claims with inferior justification (X cannot be inferred from the reason that the actor gives), qualified justification (X can be inferred from the reason that the actor gives, though the actor gives no more than one such reason), and claims with sophisticated justification (the actor offers more than one reason from which X can be inferred). We then merged the three levels of justification and contrasted them with the absence of justification for the present analysis. The results show a high level of justification. Between 60 and 73 percent of the claims contain some kind of justification. Claims by British Muslims are somewhat more often justified, while those by French are less often justified.

Deliberation also presupposes to have a positive attitude towards the other actors in the discussion. Here we captured this aspect by turning it upside down with a variable measuring the absence of a negative attitude towards the addressee of the claim.[10] The percentages shown in the table indicate the share of claims for which no negative attitude towards the addressee was reported. The overall share is quite high, ranging from 64 to 84 percent of the claims. Most

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importantly for our present purpose, Muslims in our three countries display different levels of "positivity" – or better, of "non-negativity" – towards the addressees: the Swiss Muslims clearly are on average less negative in their claims, followed by the British and finally by the French. The latter, therefore, once again come out as the less deliberative, at least as far as public deliberation is concerned.

A similar conclusion may be made looking at the next indicator of the deliberative quality of claims by Muslim actors: the kind of interest implied by the claims. Deliberative theory stresses the importance of the orientation to the public good, which can be seen in the prevalence of appeals to the general interest over appeals to actors' own special interests (della Porta 2005). This contrasts with interactions based on bargaining or compromise, which are not oriented to the public good and therefore aimed to fulfill the general interest. Our coding scheme distinguished between three kinds of interest mobilized by claims: exclusive own interest, group interest, and general interest. For this analysis, we contrast the presence of general interest with the other two kinds of interests and the absence of interest implied by the claims. Overall, between one and two fifths of the claims refer to the general interest. Once again, French Muslims are less deliberative than their British and Swiss counterparts, while Britain display a higher level of deliberation according to this criterion.

A sixth and last aspects of deliberation we consider here has to do with the distinction between hard and soft power. This is an aspect that refers to deliberation in face-to-face contexts and, more specifically, to the way discussions are terminated. This is an aspect that has been studied in particular in relation to the ways in which controversies are solved within social movement organizations and groups (della Porta and Rucht 2013). In this context, one may distinguish between two elementary kinds of power resting on different resources (Haug et al. 2013). Following a Habermasian perspective, there is, on the one hand, a form of communicative power, called soft power, based on arguments and/or the appeal to experiences and/or emotions by the use of narrative or symbols" (Haug et al. 2013: 38).[11] On the other hand, hard power "is defined as the capacity of a speaker to impose sanctions or grant rewards based on one-sided or mutual dependencies. In other words, "[t]he former is communicative power based on words and symbols, and arguments are its key source, whereas the latter is non-communicative power ultimately based on material, physical or similar kinds of sanctions (e.g. expressing a veto, threat of exit, or majority rule)" (Giugni and Nai 2013: 155). The use of soft power is obviously an sign of a higher deliberative quality of claims. In our coding scheme, however, we looked at this aspect the other way around, that is, we coded the presence or absence of hard power to stop the discussion. We therefore have a higher deliberative quality when hard power is not or little exerted. The findings suggest that this is most often the case in all three countries. However, the share of claims not making use of hard power is particularly high in Switzerland, somewhat less in Britain and France.[12]

The last two rows of the table provide two general measures of the deliberative quality of public deliberation by Muslim actors based on the six aspects examined thus far: the percentage of claims that have at least three of the six features and an overall standardized index of deliberation that takes into account all six items. As we can see, according to both indicators, claims by Muslim actors in France are less deliberative than in Britain or Switzerland. Swiss Muslims, in turn, are somewhat more deliberative than British Muslims in claims-making. On the one hand, only about one quarter of the claims made by Muslim actors in France have three or more of the

six deliberative features, as compared to about half in Britain and two thirds in Switzerland. On the other hand, the standardize index of deliberation is much lower – and even negative – in France, while it is around zero in the other two countries. Once again, this attests to a lower deliberative quality of claims made by French Muslims.

Before moving on to an attempt to show the correlates of Muslims' public deliberation, we would like to zoom in on one of the features of deliberation examined thus far, namely the type of interest implied by the claims. As we said earlier, this aspect relates to the idea that deliberation should be oriented towards the public good rather than specific sectoral interest, whether individual of collective. We can get a more accurate picture of this aspect by looking at Table 5.10, which shows the extent to which claims by Muslim actors refer to these three kinds of interests, as opposed to no interest at all.

<div align="center">Table 5.10</div>

Deliberative theory stresses the importance of the orientation to the public good, which can be seen in the prevalence of appeals to the general interest over appeals to actors' own special interests (della Porta 2005). This contrasts with interactions based on bargaining or compromise, which are not oriented to the public good and therefore aimed to fulfill the general interest. Our coding scheme distinguished between three kinds of interest mobilized by claims: exclusive own interest, group interest, and general interest. For this analysis, we contrast the presence of general interest with the other two kinds of interests and the absence of interest implied by the claims. Overall, between one and two fifths of the claims refer to the general interest. Once again, French Muslims are less deliberative than their British and Swiss counterparts, while Britain display a higher level of deliberation according to this criterion. The findings support the general trend seen so far. We already know about the share of claims referring to the general interest, which is highest in Britain and lowest in France. Now we can see that French Muslims most often refer to group interest in their claims, more so than their British counterpart, but to some extent also more than Swiss Muslims. We can also see that only a very small proportion of claims refer to exclusive own (individual) interest – indeed, never in Switzerland – and that the share of claims implying no interest is smaller in France than in the other two countries.

In sum, this descriptive analysis of public deliberation as seen in the claims made by Muslims shows that it varies in important ways across countries, not so much in terms of the deliberative values underlying the claims, which do not vary so much, suggesting that there is a common ground as far as the normative conditions for public deliberation are concerned, but above all in the quality of deliberation in the public domain. In this regard, our six indicators, as well as the overall standardized index combining them, point to a lower deliberative quality of Muslim claims in France, as compared to both Britain and Switzerland, except perhaps for the measure of reciprocity.

Explaining Deliberation by Muslim Actors in the Public Domain

The analysis carried out thus far gives us a descriptive picture of the quality or at least extent of deliberation of Muslim actors' political claims-making, that is, when they intervene in the public domain. In this section we would like to engage in a more explanatory analysis aimed to study

the relationship between claims-making and the quality of public deliberation. To do so, we run a number of regression models in which we ascertain the effect of certain features of claims on the six indicators of public deliberation discussed earlier. Table 5.11 shows the results of six binary logistic models regressing the indicators of deliberation on a number of features of claims. As dependent variables, we therefore look at the six aspects discussed earlier: symmetry, reciprocity, justification, absence of negative attitude towards the addressee, general interest, and absence of hard power. As predictors, we took the following variables: the type of actor (organizations vs. informal groups or individual actors), the type of Muslim organization (Mosques vs. other types); and the substantive issue addressed by the claims (minority integration politics vs. other issues). The findings are mainly explorative and should be take with some caution, not only because of the limited number of variables included in the models, but also because all the latter are based on a relatively low number of observations. Our main goal here is to ascertain whether the type of Muslim actors and the issues they address make a difference when it comes to the deliberative quality of their claims. Each model controls for the country (in terms of public space as discussed earlier) and shows cluster robust standard errors to take country heterogeneity into account.

Table 5.11

To start with, the country control allows us to support with statistical significance the important differences observed in the descriptive analysis, at least those between Switzerland (the reference category), on the one hand, and Britain and France, on the other. Thus, we see more specifically the significantly lower level of symmetry, absence of negative attitudes towards addressees, emphasis on the general interest and absence of hard power in France, but also the higher level of reciprocity in the claims by French Muslims, the higher level of reciprocity and emphasis on the general interest in Britain, and the lower level of absence of negative attitude towards addressees and absence of hard power in the claims by British Muslims.

Moving to the three predictors capturing features of claims, we can see that, net of country effects, there is no systematic pattern across the six models for each of these variables. Taking each predictor one by one, we can see that the type of actors plays a role – has a statistically significant effect – only on one of the six indicators of deliberation, namely general interest. The effect is positive: Muslim organizations are more likely to emphasize the general interest in their claims, as compared to informal groups or individual actors. This suggests that, at least for this specific variable, deliberation is favored by organization.

The type of Muslim actor also shows some influence. In fact, this predictor has a more consistent impact on our measures of public deliberation. We see in particular a significant effect on three aspects: symmetry, the absence of negative attitude towards addressees, and general interest. More specifically, when they intervene in public debates, Mosques are more likely to display symmetry, less likely to have a negative attitude towards the actors they address, and more likely to emphasize the general interest as opposer to some kind of private interest, whether individual or collective, than any other kind of Muslim actor. Thus, Mosques are not the dangerous forge of terrorism as some discourses tend to depict them. Quite on the contrary, they show a stronger degree of deliberation, attesting to a willingness to engage in a constructive dialogue with other societal actors and groups.

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We also observe a number of significant effects of the issue of claims. In this case, four out of the six indicators of deliberation are associated to the thematic focus of claims by Muslims. More specifically, claims addressing minority integration politics are more likely to entail symmetry and reciprocity, less likely to convey a negative attitude toward addressees, and more likely to emphasize the general interest. Thus, when it comes to debate publicly about their situation in society, that is, about issues such as minority integration, minority rights and participation – political, social, or cultural – discrimination and unequal treatment, minority social problems as well as interethnic, inter- and intraorganizational relations, Muslims tend to show a more deliberative stance than when the address any other issues.

In addition to the six features of deliberation taken separately, we also ran a final model on the overall standardized index of deliberation.[13] None of the three predictors is statistically significant in this model once we take into account heteroskedasticity across countries by estimating cluster robust standard errors. If we do not do that, however, the type of actor (organized actor) and the type of Muslim organization (Mosque) have a positive effect on the index, therefore on deliberation.[14]

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the analysis of interventions by Muslim actors in the public domain, hence continuing the analysis of political claims-making which we started in the previous chapter. This was done with the aim of ascertaining the extent and quality of public deliberation. After a description of certain features of Muslims' claims-making, such as the extent of their presence in the public domain, the forms of claims, their addressees – as well as whether they are referred to in negative or positive terms – their substantive foci, and their territorial scope, we have examined the extent and quality of public deliberation by Muslim actors. This was done firstly in a descriptive fashion and secondly following a more explanatory perspective.

The analysis of the features of claims shows that Muslims play an active and important role in public debates, albeit not always focusing on issues pertaining to Islam. At the same time, such role vary across our three countries, as it is greater in Britain and France, as compared to Britain. We also saw the predominance of verbal interventions and the consequent limited degree of contentiousness of Muslims' claims-making, although protest actions are not negligible in France. In general, most the majority of Muslim claims target civil society actors rather than state actors, but with important differences across the three countries. Further, issues dealing with minority integration politics, this time with little variation across countries, if not in the more specific issues. Finally, debates about Islam are to a large extent nationalized, most often involving national and subnational actors and issues.

In the analysis of the public deliberation we operated a distinction between the normative conditions for deliberation and its quality. This yields two main findings pointing to opposing directions. On the one hand, the deliberative values underlying Muslim claims do not vary much across our three countries, suggesting the existence of a common ground in the normative conditions for public deliberation. On the other hand, the indicators of the quality of deliberation we considered in our analysis show important cross-national variations. More specifically, we

have observed a lower deliberative quality of Muslim claims in France than in Britain and Switzerland on most of these indicators.

Finally, our exploratory regression analysis of the measures of the quality of public deliberation yielded some evidence, albeit limited, of an effect of certain features of claims on Muslims' public deliberation. In particular, we found some effect of the type of actor, the type of Muslim organization, and the issue of claims on certain measures of public deliberation. Thus, we saw that Muslim organizations and Mosques and tend to be more deliberative then informal groups or individual actors, and that claims dealing with minority integration politics are also more deliberative. All this, however, depends on the specific indicator of deliberation we focus upon.

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Table 5.1: Claims by actor (percentages)

	Britain	France	Switzerland
State and party actors	*41.0*	*39.2*	*42.1*
Government	21.2	20.1	10.9
Legislative	5.0	2.7	4.6
Judiciary	2.6	4.3	5.2
State executive agencies	9.9	6.6	8.3
Political parties	2.4	5.5	13.1
(Other) Civil society actors	*28.0*	*37.6*	*30.4*
Socioeconomic actors	1.0	.8	0.0
(Other) Religious and minority actors	3.9	2.1	3.2
Media and journalists	4.0	8.8	5.8
Researchers, think thanks, and intellectuals	4.2	10.4	10.5
Pro-minority actors	2.4	2.0	1.0
Anti-minority actors	2.9	.8	1.8
Other civil society actors	9.5	12.8	8.5
Muslim actors	*31.0*	*23.2*	*27.6*
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	619	717	497

Notes: Muslim actors are coded based on their religion. The following categories are included: Muslim/Islamic (not specified), Sunnite, Chiite, Jihadist Sunnite, Jihadist Chiite, Sufi, Ahmadiyya, Al-Ahbash, Salafiti, Tablighi, Mouridi, Alevi. Claims with unknown actors are excluded.
Pearson chi2(24) = 150.4470, Pr = 0.000, Cramer's V = 0.1997 (detailed categories)
Pearson chi2(4) = 19.3616 Pr = 0.001, Cramer's V = 0.0716 (aggregate categories)

Table 5.2: Forms of claims by Muslim actors (percentages)

	Britain	France	Switzerland
Verbal statements	*89.2*	*80.8*	*92.6*
Conventional actions	*5.7*	*13.0*	*5.7*
Protest actions	*5.1*	*6.2*	*.8*
Demonstrative protests	2.6	2.7	.8
Confrontational protests	1.3	0.0	.0
Violent protests	1.3	3.4	.0
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	157	146	122

Pearson chi2(8) = 16.3669, Pr = 0.037, Cramer's V = 0.1388 (detailed categories)
Pearson chi2(4) = 11.5529, Pr = 0.021, Cramer's V = 0.1166 (aggregate categories)

Table 5.3: Addressees of claims by Muslim actors (percentages)

	Britain	France	Switzerland
State and party actors	*38.1*	*39.6*	*41.2*
Government	22.7	20.8	32.4
Legislative	1.0	0.0	1.5
Judiciary	5.2	7.6	2.9
State executive agencies	6.2	5.7	1.5
Political parties	3.1	5.7	2.9
Civil society actors	*61.9*	*60.4*	*58.8*
Socioeconomic actors	2.1	0.0	0.0
Religious and minority actors	28.9	37.7	17.7
Media and journalists	4.1	18.9	27.9
Researchers, think thanks, and intellectuals	0.0	0.0	1.5
Pro-minority actors	1.0	0.0	0.0
Anti-minority actors	3.1	1.9	0.0
Other civil society actors	22.7	1.9	11.8
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	97	53	68

Notes: Claims with unknown addressees are excluded.
Pearson chi2(22) = 45.8724, Pr = 0.002, Cramer's V = 0.3244 (detailed categories)
Pearson chi2(2) = 0.1547, Pr = .0926, Cramer's V = 0.0266 (aggregate categories)

Table 5.4: Actors criticized in claims by Muslim actors (percentages)

	Britain	France	Switzerland
State and party actors	*40.9*	*43.3*	*30.3*
Government	23.7	31.3	27.3
Legislative	3.2	0.0	0.0
Judiciary	4.3	3.0	3.0
State executive agencies	6.5	3.0	0.0
Political parties	3.2	6.0	0.0
Civil society actors	*59.2*	*56.7*	*69.7*
Socioeconomic actors	2.2	1.5	0.0
Religious and minority actors	31.2	29.9	21.2
Media and journalists	7.5	4.5	15.2
Researchers, think thanks, and intellectuals	0.0	1.5	3.0
Pro-minority actors	0.0	0.0	0.0
Anti-minority actors	9.7	9.0	21.2
Other civil society actors	8.6	10.5	9.1
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	93	67	33

Notes: Claims with unknown criticized actors are excluded.
Pearson chi2(20) = 20.0693, Pr = .454, Cramer's V = 0.2280 (detailed categories)
Pearson chi2(2) = 1.6231, Pr = .0444, Cramer's V = 0.0917 (aggregate categories)

Table 5.5: Actors supported in claims by Muslim actors (percentages)

	Britain	France	Switzerland
State and party actors	*5.0*	*15.0*	*14.3*
Government	2.5	15.0	7.1
Legislative	0.0	0.0	0.0
Judiciary	0.0	0.0	7.1
State executive agencies	2.5	0.0	0.0
Political parties	0.0	0.0	0.0
Civil society actors	*95.0*	*85.0*	*85.7t*
Socioeconomic actors	1.3	0.0	0.0
Religious and minority actors	80.0	68.3	78.6
Media and journalists	2.5	0.0	0.0
Researchers, think thanks, and intellectuals	0.0	0.0	7.1
Pro-minority actors	1.3	1.7	0.0
Anti-minority actors	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other civil society actors	10.0	15.0	0.0
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	80	60	14

Notes: Claims with unknown supported actors are excluded.
Pearson chi2(16) = 34.8717, Pr = 0.004, Cramer's V = 0.3365 (detailed categories)
Pearson chi2(2) = 4.2618, Pr = 0.119, Cramer's V = 0.1664 (aggregate categories)

Table 5.6: Issues of claims by Muslim actors (percentages)

	Britain	France	Switzerland
Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	*0.5*	*0.6*	*0.0*
Minority integration politics	*73.8*	*73.0*	*73.5*
Minority integration general	4.7	2.3	9.6
Minority rights and participation	11.0	27.5	28.7
Discrimination and unequal treatment	2.6	0.6	1.5
Minority social problems	49.2	35.4	30.9
Interethnic, inter-, and intraorganizational relations	6.2	7.3	2.9
Anti-racism	*3.1*	*1.7*	*3.7*
Racism in institutional contexts	2.6	0.6	2.9
Non-institutional racism, xenophobia, and extreme right tendencies in society	0.5	1.1	0.7
Anti-islamophobia	*7.9*	*14.0*	*13.2*
Islamophobia in institutional contexts	6.8	6.2	11.0
Non-institutional islamophobic tendencies in society	1.1	7.9	2.2
Islamophobic claims	*4.7*	*0.6*	*0.7*
Actor claims Muslims	*10.0*	*10.1*	*8.8*
Homeland politics	0.5	0.0	0.0
Transnational politics	9.4	10.1	8.8
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	191	178	136

Pearson chi2(24) = 67.3189, Pr = 0.000, Cramer's V = 0.2582 (detailed categories)
Pearson chi2(10) = 14.7892, Pr = 0.140, Cramer's V = 0.1210 (aggregate categories)

Table 5.7: Scope of claims by Muslim actors (percentages)

	Britain	France	Switzerland
Actors			
Supra- or transnational	15.9	14.2	3.1
Foreign national or bilateral	1.3	2.7	10.4
National	30.5	19.5	44.8
Subnational	52.3	63.7	41.7
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	151	113	96
Issues			
Supra- or transnational	33.0	16.2	29.5
Foreign national or bilateral	1.7	1.4	2.3
National	36.9	40.1	43.4
Subnational	28.4	42.3	24.8
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	176	142	129

Notes: Claims with unknown scope are excluded.
Pearson chi2(6) = 36.8242, Pr = 0.000, Cramer's V = 0.2262 (actors)
Pearson chi2(6) = 17.4647, Pr = 0.008, Cramer's V = 0.1398 (issues)

Table 5.8: Values of claims by Muslim actors (percentages)

	Britain	France	Switzerland
Deliberative values	23.2	28.4	25.9
Other values	76.8	71.6	74.1
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	82	102	81

Notes: Deliberative values include the following categories: equal treatment; fairness; openness/transparency; trust; truthfulness, honesty, and sincerity; respect for difference; and mutual understanding. Claims with no values are excluded.
Pearson chi2(2) = 0.6540, Pr = 0.721, Cramer's V = 0.0497

Table 5.9: Deliberative quality of claims by Muslim actors (percentages)

	Britain	France	Switzerland
Symmetry	90.8	64.0	92.7
Reciprocity	11.3	11.4	2.8
Justification	73.1	60.0	68.8
Absence of negative attitude towards addressee	69.1	63.6	84.0
General interest	39.2	21.7	28.6
Absence of hard power	85.1	84.3	97.0
Percentage of claims with at least 3 features	51.57	27.5	63.0
Standardized index (mean)	.00	-.27	.03
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	67-143	44-157	33-50

Notes: Claims with ambiguous symmetry, reciprocity or attitude towards addressee are excluded. N may vary depending on the specific variable at hand (N= for the index).
Pearson chi2(2) = 21.4693, Pr = 0.000, Cramer's V = 0.3276 (symmetry)
Pearson chi2(2) = 2.3800, Pr = 0.304, Cramer's V = 0.1220 (reciprocity)
Pearson chi2(2) = 4.5689, Pr = 0.102, Cramer's V = 0.1271 (justification)
Pearson chi2(2) = 7.0610, Pr = 0.029, Cramer's V = 0.1497 (absence of negative attitude towards addressee)
Pearson chi2(2) = 10.9814, Pr = 0.004, Cramer's V = 0.1811 (general interest)
Pearson chi2(2) = 3.6872, Pr = 0.158, Cramer's V = 0.1331 (absence of hard power)

Table 5.10: Type of interest implied by claims by Muslim actors (percentages)

	Britain	France	Switzerland
No interest	17.5	10.8	17.1
Exclusive own interest	5.6	4.5	0.0
Group interest	37.8	63.1	54.3
General interest	39.2	21.7	28.6
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	143	157	35

Pearson chi2(6) = 21.5900, Pr = 0.001, Cramer's V = 0.1795

Table 5.11: Effects of features of claims by Muslim actors on six measures of deliberation

	Symmetry		Reciprocity		Justification		Absence of negative attitude towards addressee		General interest		Absence of hard power	
Organization	1.20	(1.19)	2.16	(1.91)	0.07	(0.57)	-0.19	(0.30)	0.73***	(0.22)	1.17	(0.92)
Mosque	1.30*	(0.55)	-0.55	(0.35)	0.16	(0.59)	1.35***	(0.31)	0.53*	(0.25)	0.96	(1.39)
Minority integration politics	0.78*	(0.38)	1.44***	(0.37)	-0.50	(0.29)	0.79*	(0.37)	0.37*	(0.15)	0.03	(0.54)
Country (ref.: Switzerland)												
Britain	0.03	(0.25)	1.86***	(0.22)	0.15	(0.20)	-0.81***	(0.01)	0.42***	(0.07)	-1.10***	(0.09)
France	-2.69***	(0.03)	0.48***	(0.14)	-0.38	(0.27)	-1.40***	(0.09)	-0.84***	(0.15)	-1.77***	(0.33)
Constant	1.21	(0.62)	-6.37***	(1.78)	1.10*	(0.48)	1.02*	(0.46)	-1.60***	(0.15)	2.24***	(0.33)
Log likelihood	-46.08		-23.95		-125.93		-.121.72		-137.00		-49.80	
Pseudo R-Squared	.28		.16		.02		.11		.07		.11	
N	146		110		203		227		244		141	

* p≤.05; ** p≤.01; *** p≤.001

Notes: Logistic regressions (unstandardized coefficients). Robust standard errors between parentheses. Contrasts for the dummies: organizations vs. informal groups or individual actors; Mosque vs. other types of Muslim organizations; minority integration politics vs. other issues.

Notes

[1] The number and share of claims in our three countries is quite similar if we look at the country in which they were made or at the public space which they refer to: 592 (30.7 percent) in Britain, 748 (34.8 percent) in France, and 513 (26.6 percent), respectively 636 (32.1 percent) in Britain, 807 (40.7 percent) in France, and 505 (25.5 percent) in Switzerland.

[2] Muslim actors have been coded based on their religion. The following categories were included: Muslim/Islamic (not specified), Sunnite, Chiite, Jihadist Sunnite, Jihadist Chiite, Sufi, Ahmadiyya, Al-Ahbash, Salafiti, Tablighi, Mouridi, Alevi.

[3] It should be noted that here we cannot exclude a coding issue, insofar as the line dividing government and legislative power, on one hand, from political parties, on the other, might be hard to draw sometimes.

[4] It should be noted that claims by Muslim are somewhat overestimated with respect to those of the other actors since, for them, we also coded claims on issues other than Islam. The latter represent about 10 percent of Muslim claims (see Table 5.6).

[5] The addressee, narrowly defined, is the actor who is held responsible for acting with regard to the claim or at whom the claim is directly addressed as a call to act. In other words, this is the actor at whom a demand is explicitly addressed (usually, a state actor). The criticized actors is the actor who is overtly criticized or mentioned in a negative way in the claim. The supported actor is the actor sustained by the subject.

[6] This share is notably reduced if we look at all the claims (about the half). However, as for other aspects, here we only consider claims that has some kind of identifiable value frame.

[7] This index was created by calculating the standardized reliability coefficient on the six items (Chronbach's alpha = .43).

[8] Claims with ambiguous symmetry were excluded from the analysis.

[9] Claims with ambiguous reciprocity were excluded from the analysis.

[10] Claims with ambiguous attitude towards the addressee were excluded from the analysis.

[11] This definition of soft power differ somewhat from the kore traditional ones, which are based exclusively on cognition and rationality as well as the force of the better argument.

[12] In addition to the presence or absence of hard power, we also gathered information on two related aspects: the source of hard power (distinguishing between resources, personal characteristics, representation of others, authority of rules, and other sources) and the type of hard power (distinguishing between legitimate forces and illegitimate forces). These additional variables, however, are not used in the present analysis.

[13] Since the index of deliberation is a continuous variable, in this case we run a OLS regression model with the same predictors as in the other models and cluster robust standard errors.

[14] Similarly, the following effects becomes statistically significant in the other models once we do not estimate cluster robust standard errors: the effect of the type of actor (organization) and the type of Muslim organization (Mosque) on symmetry, the effect of the type of actor (organization) on reciprocity (but only at the 10-percent level), and the effect of the type of actor (organization) on the absence of hard power. At the same time, however, we must say that some other effects lose statistical significance when we do so.